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IS THAT A KIELBASA IN YOUR POCKET?
APPLYING A HYBRID STANDARD TO THE
FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY ACT WHEN BANK
ROBBERS WIELD OBJECTS AS WEAPONS
DURING A BANK ROBBERY
CORY A. HUTCHENS*
The Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S. C. § 2113, outlines the punishment
for those who rob federally insured banks. More specifically, the Act has an
"armed bank robbery" provision that imposes harsher punishment on anyone
who "assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the h fe of any person by the use of
a dangerous weapon or device." This provision was the focus of a recent
Seventh Circuit decision involving a bank robber who robbed two banks
brandishing a long-barreled lighter as a gun. This Comment argues that the
Seventh Circuit erroneously held that the lighter was not a "dangerous weapon"
under the armed bank robbery provision. Accordingly, it argues that defendants
who rob banks brandishing objects as weapons can be guilty of armed bank
robbery under the Federal Bank Robbery Act. To determine whether an "armed"
defendant commits armed bank robbery, this Comment proposes a hybrid
standard: whether a reasonable person in a bank robbery victim's position
would perceive the situation as one involving an actual weapon.
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"You can't rob a bank on charm and personality."
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are working as a bank teller when someone enters the
bank and yells, "Give me the money or I'll shoot!" while waving a
long-barreled butane lighter. You might understandably be nervous
or confused, but you likely would not immediately fear for your life.
Imagine next, however, that instead of openly brandishing the
lighter, the person approached you from behind, pressed the cold
metal barrel against your neck, and made the same demand for
money. In that instant, you would have no way of knowing what the
object was, and you would likely comply with the menacing demand.
The fact that a long-barreled lighter is not a particularly frightening
item does not preclude bank robbers from using it to sow more fear
in victims during a robbery.
Interestingly, a similar scenario gave rise to the recent case United
States v. Dixon,' in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decided not to consider a long-barreled lighter a
"dangerous weapon"' under 18 U.S.C. § 2113, commonly known as
the Federal Bank Robbery Act.4 This Comment, however, argues that
the Seventh Circuit should have concluded that the lighter was a
"dangerous weapon" because of how the defendant used it. Reaching
this conclusion requires examining the Federal Bank Robbery Act
and corresponding jurisprudence.
The Federal Bank Robbery Act provides the framework for
punishing those who rob federally insured banks.' Under § 2113(a)
of the Act, anyone who obtains a federal bank's property using force,
violence, or intimidation can be fined, imprisoned, or both.' Section
2113(d) of the Act enhances punishment whenever an individual
1. A quote by the famous bank robber, Willie Sutton. See Bank Heists: Crime and
Leniency, EcONOMIsT (Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-
and-economics/21664151-after-armed-robberies-banks-give-out-loans-better-terms-
crime-and-leniency.
2. 790 F.3d 758 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 425 (2015).
3. Id. at 760.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2012).
5. Id.
6. Id. § 2113(a).
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"assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the
use of a dangerous weapon or device" during a bank robbery. Over
the years, courts have split in their interpretations of § 2113(d).
Courts analyze § 2113(d) under either a subjective or an objective
framework.' The objective test requires the weapon or device to be
capable of assaulting or jeopardizing someone.' Conversely, the
subjective test hinges on whether an individual reasonably believed a
bank robber's weapon or device could have assaulted or placed him
or her in jeopardy."' Each framework, however, has its own
shortcomings: a purely objective test makes § 2113(d) too rigid,"
while a purely subjective approach requires delving into the intricate
subjective responses of witnesses, all of whom react differently.1 2
Exploring the drawbacks of each approach exposes the need for a
better analytical framework for § 2113(d).
Accordingly, this Comment proposes a hybrid standard suitable to
analyze situations-like the one in Dixon-in which an individual robs
a bank brandishing an object as a weapon. The hybrid standard
considers whether a reasonable person in a bank robbery victim's
situation would have believed the object brandished was an actual
weapon. To guide this standard, this approach focuses on four
elements: (1) whether a bank robber made a display or gesture in a
manner consistent with having an actual weapon, (2) whether a bank
robber made threats indicating the object was an actual weapon, (3)
whether the bank robber intended to portray the object as a weapon,
and (4) whether the manner in which the bank robber used the
object created a charged and hostile atmosphere.
7. Id. § 2113(d).
8. See generally Russell J. Davis, Annotation, What Constitutes "Puts in Jeopardy"
Within Enhanced Penalty Provision of Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S. C.A. § 2113(d), 32
A.L.R. Fed. 279, § 3-4 (1977 & Supp. 2015) (providing a survey of various courts that
apply either the subjective or objective approaches).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1977)
("[T]he 'in jeopardy' element of [§] 2113(d) is met when a robbery victim is 'placed
in an objective state of danger. ... '" (quoting United States v. Roustio, 455 F.2d 366,
371-72 (7th Cir. 1972))).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Newkirk, 481 F.2d 881, 883 (4th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) ("[T]he government is not required to prove that the weapon used in a
robbery was capable of putting the lives of bank employees in actual, as opposed to
apparent, jeopardy. . . .").
11. See infra note 88 (demonstrating that the objective approach is too inflexible
and deviates from § 2113(d)'s legislative history).
12. See infra Section II.B (summarizing the drawbacks of the subjective approach).
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Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the Federal Bank
Robbery Act and pertinent jurisprudence surrounding § 2113(d).
This Part also elucidates how courts interpret § 2113(d), with an
emphasis on both the subjective and objective approaches. This Part
concludes by giving an overview of United States v. Dixon. Part II
explores the pitfalls of both the objective and subjective approaches and
stresses the need for a hybrid approach to govern § 2113(d). Part III
presents and analyzes the proposed hybrid standard, exploring each
element in detail. This Part also reconsiders Dixon under the hybrid
approach. Part IV recommends a rewording of § 2113(d) so that
courts can apply it more easily to situations in which a bank robber
uses a harmless object as a weapon when robbing a bank.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of the Federal Bank Robbery Act
Prior to 1934, criminal statutes protecting federal banks only
proscribed embezzlement and similar offenses.1 3  Bank robbery,
burglary, and larceny were punishable only under state law." These
state statutory frameworks proved troublesome in the early 1930s
when there was an outbreak of "gangsters" robbing banks and
eluding authorities by operating across state lines.' State authorities
were frequently unable to combat these interstate criminal activities,
and the need for federal help arose."
Responding to this increase in interstate bank robberies, Congress
enacted the original Federal Bank Robbery Act in 1934." The Act's
purpose was to deter and severely punish individuals who ventured to
13. See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 102 (1943) (providing a brief
overview of the history of the Federal Bank Robbery Act).
14. Id.
15. See generally Jennifer M. Lota, Comment, Analyzing 18 US.C. § 2113(A) of the
Federal Bank Robbery Act: Achieving Safety and Upholding Precedent Through Statutory
Amendment, 7 SETON HALL CIR. REv. 445, 449 (2011) (supplying a history of the
Federal Bank Robbery Act).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1461, at 2 (1934) (containing the Attorney General's
statement to the Committee on the Judiciary, which noted that these "organized
gangsters" were "powerful and well equipped to defy local police").
17. See 78 CONG. REc. 2946 (1934) (statement of Rep. Ashurst) (classifying
various bills, including the bill that became the original Bank Robbery Act, as
"antigangster bills"); see also Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 363 (1983) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (explaining that the 1934 Act was a response to traveling, armed bank
robbers, such as John Dillinger, who outmaneuvered police across state lines and
committed a string of bank robberies).
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rob federally insured banks.'8  The original Act, however, only
covered bank robbery, which required taking bank property through
force, intimidation, or violence." Inevitably, this version of the Act
led to inconsistent results because would-be robbers could escape
punishment by taking money from a bank without using force,
intimidation, or fear.20 In other words, this earlier version of the Act
did not encompass bank larceny." To remedy this discrepancy, the
Attorney General requested that Congress amend the Act, which it
did in 1937." Several years later, in 1948, Congress passed the Act
"substantially [in] its present form."
B. The Current Federal Bank Robbery Act
The present Act outlines the appropriate punishment for federal
bank robbery and other incidental crimes." Section 2113(a)
prohibits taking or attempting to take anything of value belonging to
a federal bank "by force and violence, or by intimidation."25 This
section also contains prohibitions on bank larceny, taking bank
property without any force, violence, or intimidation, and bank
burglary, entering a bank with the intent to commit any felony
therein. Violating § 2113(a) is punishable by a fine, imprisonment
up to twenty years, or both.
18. S. REP. No. 73-537, at 1 (1934); see 78 CONG. REc. 8148 (1934) (statement of
Rep. Glover) ("The robbing of banks and killing of people for the purpose of taking
away money deposited by citizens ... is a crime that should be severely punished, and
this bill provides a punishment that will deter anyone from attempting bank
robbery. . . .").
19. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 323 (1957). This earlier version of the
Act also outlawed aggravated assault and homicide committed during a bank
robbery. Id. at 325.
20. See, e.g., Bel4 462 U.S. at 357, 361 (describing an "incongruous result" where a
man using a false identity stole a check, forged the endorsement and deposited the
check into an account he created with fake credentials, and then closed the account
to receive the balance).
21. See, e.g., id. at 361 ("As originally enacted in 1934, the Federal Bank Robbery
Act .. . governed only robbery-a crime requiring a forcible taking.").
22. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 281 (2000) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 281-82.
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2012). The Federal Bank Robbery Act contains other
sections proscribing various crimes-such as kidnapping, homicide, and receiving
stolen property-committed during or after a bank robbery; however, this Comment
is concerned only with subsections (a) and (d).
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Textually, § 2113(d) of the Act is essentially an "armed bank
robbery" provision.2 ' This section imposes a harsher punishment if,
during a bank robbery, an individual "assaults any person, or puts in
jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or
device."" Subsections 2113(d) and (a) are related in that the former
aggravates the latter"' by imposing a higher punishment of a fine or
imprisonment not more than twenty-five years, or both." Further,
the "use of a dangerous weapon or device" clause in § 2113(d)
modifies both the "assault" and "places in jeopardy" clauses.2 An
individual must also "use" the dangerous weapon or device to satisfy
the section's requirements.3 "Use" amounts to something more than
possession,34 meaning that carrying a concealed weapon or device
does not satisfy § 2113(d). Section 2113(d) therefore discourages
violent bank robberies by punishing more harshly those who use
dangerous weapons or devices.
An examination of § 2113(d)'s legislative history defines another
key aspect of the provision: what constitutes a "dangerous weapon or
device." Before Congress passed the present-day version of
§ 2113(d), it only included the phrase "dangerous weapon," not
"dangerous weapon or device."3 ' Representative Blanton argued that
some objects, like a bottle of water declared to be nitroglycerin, or a
28. E.g., United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002).
29. § 2113(d).
30. E.g., Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 306 (1961) (plurality opinion).
31. Compare § 2113(d) (authorizing a maximum penalty of twenty-five years
imprisonment, a fine, or both), with § 2113(a) (carrying a penalty of not more than
twenty years imprisonment, a fine, or both).
32. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11 n.6 (1978), superseded by statute,
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473 § 1005(a), 98 Stat.
2138, 2138-39, as recognized in United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) (citing
United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (6th Cir. 1971) (McCree, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Odom, 329 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that "'use' . . . requires some type of 'active employment"'); United
States v. De Palma, 414 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1969) (determining that a person
must use a dangerous weapon or device to trigger § 2113(d)).
34. United States v. Perry, 991 F.2d 304, 309 (6th Cir. 1993). The Perry court
analyzed a situation in which a bank robber kept a weapon concealed throughout
the robbery and decided that he did not "use" a dangerous weapon or device under
§ 2113(d). Id.
35. See United States v. Wardy, 777 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1985) (positing that a
bank robber who had a gun, but kept it concealed throughout a robbery, would
probably not trigger § 2113(d)).
36. See 78 CONG. REc. 8132 (1934) (containing the Floor Debate surrounding the
provision that became § 2113(d)).
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wooden gun, should qualify as "dangerous weapon[s]" because of
those objects' ability to incite fear. He explained that a water bottle
claimed to be nitroglycerin "would have the same effect
psychologically on the minds of the people in the bank" as if it
actually were nitroglycerin." The various other representatives
discussing § 2113(d) agreed with Representative Blanton about the
phrase "or device," believing that it would encompass objects that
incite fear."
C. PertinentJurisprudence Surrounding § 2113(d)
Like the law in general, jurisprudence surrounding § 2113(d) is
not black and white. As one would expect, a large amount of
§ 2113(d) case law involves a bank robber using a firearm to
effectuate the robbery." Loaded guns, unloaded guns, replica guns,
and toy guns all satisfy § 2113(d)." More broadly, courts facing a
§ 2113(d) analysis apply either a subjective approach, contemplating
a victim's reasonable belief that a weapon or device can harm, or an
objective approach, contemplating the weapon or device's actual
ability to harm. Examining precedent surrounding actual,
unloaded, and toy guns, as well as both the objective and subjective
approach, provides insight into § 2113(d)'s fundamentals.
1. Actual guns, unloaded guns, and toy guns
A gun is the most common weapon of choice used when robbing a
bank.3 Individuals who use actual guns during a bank robbery
conclusively satisfy § 2113(d)." Courts formerly held that the jury could
37. Id. (statement of Rep. Blanton).
38. Id.
39. See id. (statement of Rep. Sumners).
40. See infra note 44 (containing examples of bank robbers using firearms to rob
banks). But see United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1989)
(noting that § 2113(d) is not limited to firearms).
41. See infra Section I.C.1 (providing the rationale as to why actual, unloaded, toy,
and replica guns all satisfy § 2113(d)).
42. See infra Section I.C.2.a-b (detailing both the objective and subjective
frameworks).
43. See Baker v. United States, 412 F.2d 1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that §
2113(d) covers guns, the most common weapons individuals use to rob banks).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 523 F.2d 253, 260 (2d Cir. 1975) (concluding
that a man satisfied § 2113(d) when he used a handgun to force his way into a bank
and demanded money); Morrow v. United States, 408 F.2d 1390, 1391 (8th Cir.
1969) (holding that a shotgun was a dangerous weapon under § 2113(d)).
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infer that any gun used during a bank robbery was loaded." Courts
rationalized this inference by determining that threatening others with a
gun is tantamount to the bank robber announcing that his gun is
loaded and that he will shoot if his commands are not obeyed.6
Inferring that any gun a bank robber used was loaded became
unnecessary after McLaughlin v. United States,47 in which the United
States Supreme Court explicitly held that unloaded guns are per se
dangerous weapons under § 2113(d)." In McLaughlin, two men
robbed a bank using an unloaded handgun." The Court determined
it was a dangerous weapon, even when unloaded, for three reasons."
First, guns are characteristically manufactured and sold as dangerous
devices, justifying a presumption that a gun is always dangerous even
though it may not be loaded." Second, displaying a gun instills fear
into the average person, creating the immediate danger of a violent
response from others to neutralize the gun." Third and finally, a
bank robber could use an unloaded gun as a bludgeon." The
Supreme Court held that each of these three reasons was
independently sufficient to support the conclusion that an unloaded
gun is a dangerous weapon under § 2113(d).54
While many have used both loaded and unloaded actual guns,
individuals also have used toy or wooden guns to rob a bank."
Courts have unanimously held that toy guns and wooden guns satisfy
§ 2113(d)." Toy or wooden guns are comparable to unloaded guns
45. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 365 F.2d 672, 674 (10th Cir. 1966) (allowing
the jury to infer the guns were loaded when there was no proof indicating
otherwise); see also United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1970)
(holding that when "a robber displays a gun to back up his demands, he wants the
victim to believe that it is loaded, and the fact-finder may fairly infer that it was"
(quoting Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524, 530 n.8 (9th Cir. 1959))).
46. Marshall, 427 F.2d at 437.
47. 476 U.S. 16 (1986).
48. Id. at 17.
49. Id. at 16.
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 17-18.
53. Id. at 18.
54. Id. at 17.
55. See infra note 56.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 991 F.2d 304, 308 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding
that a wooden gun was a dangerous device or weapon); United States v. Martinez-
Jimenez, 864 F.2d 664, 665 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a toy gun is a dangerous
weapon). In Martinez-fimenez, the court determined that witnesses believed a bank
robber's toy gun was a real gun. 864 F.2d at 665. A codefendant testified that
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because they create some of the same risks as an unloaded or
inoperable gun. Those risks include (1) subjecting victims to
greater apprehension and fear, (2) requiring law enforcement to
counter an apparently immediate threat by formulating deliberate
and less efficient responses, and (3) increasing the likelihood that
officers or bank guards will retaliate with deadly force.5 ' Because
anyone faced with what appears to be a genuine gun can reasonably
believe it is a real weapon, courts have found easily that toy or
wooden guns are "dangerous weapons" under § 2113(d)."
2. Circuit court interpretations of § 2113(d)
Although § 2113(d) analysis seems relatively simple when bank
robbers use actual or replica firearms, courts faced with a § 2113(d)
analysis will still employ either a subjective or an objective analytical
framework.' Under the objective approach, the weapon or device
must actually be capable of assaulting or placing lives in jeopardy.'
Under the subjective approach, the weapon or device can satisfy §
2113(d) if witnesses or victims reasonably believe the weapon or
device is capable of causing harm." Each framework has various
strengths and weaknesses.
neither of the men "wanted the bank employees to believe that they had a real gun,
and that they did not want the bank employees to be in fear for their lives." Id. The
defendant who wielded the gun testified that he had "carried the toy gun because he
felt secure with it and that . .. he held it down toward his leg . .. so that people
would not see it." Id.
57. Martinez-fimenez, 864 F.2d at 666.
58. Id. at 666-67. The Ninth Circuit also noted that § 2113(d) focuses on the
harms created, not the manner in which the harm is created. Id. at 667.
59. Id. at 667-68. Many other circuits follow the Martinez-fimenez ruling. See, e.g.,
United States v. Medved, 905 F.2d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that Martinez-
Jimenez was decided correctly and adopting the decision as law of the 6th Circuit).
60. See generally Davis, supra note 8.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Burger, 419 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir. 1969) (per
curiam) (producing a "common sense" reading of jeopardy in which the jury can
"reasonably consider that ... life was in peril, not merely thought to be" (quoting
Smith v. United States, 284 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1960))).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Newkirk, 481 F.2d 881, 883 (4th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) ("[Tjhe government is not required to prove that the weapon used in a
robbery was capable of putting the lives of bank employees in actual, as opposed to
apparent, jeopardy. . . .") (emphasis added).
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a. The objective approach
The more stringent of the two frameworks is the objective
approach." Under this approach, courts are not interested in
whether bank robbery victims feared for their lives." Rather, this
approach focuses on whether a bank robber used a dangerous
weapon or device capable of actually placing someone's life in
danger.5 This approach requires a risk of actual danger, but not an
actual injury.' It therefore follows that physical injury is sufficient for
"actual danger," but it is not necessary."
Of course, the most obvious example of an objectively dangerous
weapon is a gun.' Even if the defendant does not fire the gun, the
prosecution can still satisfy the objective approach because courts
find it reasonable to infer that one who is threatening to use a gun
can actually use it to back up his unlawful demands." Further, the
objective approach does not require a robber to continuously
brandish or point a gun.o A robber who displays a gun-even
63. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (suggesting that the objective
standard requires that a weapon or device be actually capable of causing harm, while
the subjective one requires only the reasonable belief that the weapon or device can
cause harm).
64. E.g., United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1348 (8th Cir. 1984).
65. See United States v. Tutt, 704 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
(deciding that the purpose of § 2113(d) was "to allow higher sentences to be
imposed on those who use dangerous weapons in a way reasonably calculated to put
life in [actual] danger" (quoting United States v.Johnson, 401 F.2d 746, 747 (2d Cir.
1968) (per curiam))).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1977)
(holding that § 2113(d) requires a bank robber to place a robbery victim in an actual
"state of danger"). The objective approach therefore only requires a risk or state of actual
danger, meaning the bank robber does not have to physically injure someone. Id.
67. United States v. De Palma, 414 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1969).
68. See Tutt, 704 F.2d at 1568 (acknowledging that guns used at the scene of a
bank robbery are dangerous as a matter of law and therefore place onlookers "in an
objective state of danger" (quoting United States v. Parker, 542 F.2d 932, 934 (5th
Cir. 1976) (per curiam))).
69. See United States v. Cobbs, 481 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1973) (determining
that a jury may find that actual jeopardy exists even if a robber does not discharge
the gun or actually press the barrel of the gun to someone's body); United States v.
Potts, 548 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (noting that, while a conviction
under § 2113(d) requires use of a loaded gun or other weapon capable of inflicting
injury, ajury may infer that the threat to use a gun suggests that the gun was loaded);
supra note 45.
70. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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briefly-objectively places lives in danger because the display alone
alludes to the possibility that the robber can actually hurt someone."
The objective approach is susceptible to both praise and scrutiny.
Many courts favor the objective standard because, absent a finding of
objective danger, there would be no distinction between § 2113(d)
and (a). To elaborate, if § 2113(d) did not require an objective
finding of harm, the defendant is only using intimidation or fear,
which is already proscribed under § 2113(a). Conversely, some
disfavor the objective approach because it is more difficult for the
prosecution to prove its case than under the subjective approach.74
The prosecution must rely on the facts and whether a victim was
actually placed in jeopardy, as opposed to a reasonable fear of injury,
which could be easier to prove.
b. The subjective approach
A bank robber can satisfy § 2113(d) under the subjective approach
by using a dangerous weapon or device in a manner that causes a
victim to reasonably expect danger or injury. More specifically,
courts look to whether witnesses reasonably believe a robber's
weapon or device can cause actual harm, not whether the weapon or
device can actually harm someone. Accordingly, some courts have
71. See United States v. Roustio, 455 F.2d 366, 372 (7th Cir. 1972) (reasoning that
a robber satisfied the objective approach when he showed a teller a gun tucked in his
waistband); De Palma, 414 F.2d at 396 (rejecting the argument that a brief display of a
gun did not satisfy the objective approach).
72. E.g., Bradley v. United States, 447 F.2d 264, 275 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that
an assault under § 2113(d) requires "an objective capability to cause physical
harm[,]" and that holding otherwise would render (d) redundant), vacated, 404 U.S.
567 (1972). Recall that § 2113(a) prohibits taking bank property "by force or
violence, or by intimidation." 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012).
73. See United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1970) (rejecting a
jury charge defining 'jeopardy" as fear of death or injury because actual risk of injury
is needed to distinguish § 2113(a) and (d)).
74. See Davis, supra note 8, § 2b (indicating that the objective test places a more
difficult burden on the prosecution than the subjective test).
75. See id. (concluding that the objective test proves more burdensome for the
prosecution as it requires a reliance on the "harder" facts of the case).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Newkirk, 481 F.2d 881, 883 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(noting that the government is not required to prove that a weapon used in a robbery was
actually capable of endangering lives, and that apparentjeopardy was sufficient).
77. See United States v. Levi, 45 F.3d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (establishing that a
bank robber violates § 2113(d) simply by displaying an object that is reasonably
perceived as a dangerous weapon or device); United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361,
362 (4th Cir. 1972) (rejecting the argument that the Government needed to
establish that the "dangerous weapon" was actually capable of putting lives in actual,
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adopted a three-pronged adaptation of the subjective approach:
§ 2113(d) is satisfied when a defendant (1) creates an apparently
dangerous situation, (2) intends to intimidate a victim beyond the
mere use of language, and (3) places the victim in a reasonable
expectation of death or serious bodily harm."
The subjective approach concentrates on apparent jeopardy,
meaning certain items appearing to be weapons can satisfy this
approach. For instance, courts have concluded that a hoax bomb
placed individuals in a reasonable expectation of danger, thereby
warranting § 2113(d) punishment." A device that appears to be a
weapon and that a perpetrator implies is authentic will satisfy the
subjective approach because the perpetrator has incited a reasonable
expectation of danger."' An individual's reaction to what he or she
believes is a dangerous weapon can further reveal whether that
individual had a reasonable expectation of danger." As most people
reasonably expect danger when faced with an apparent weapon, every
circuit has generally concluded that "'a fake weapon that was never
intended to be operable' . . . constitutes a dangerous weapon for the
purposes of the armed robbery statute.""
Some courts interpret the subjective approach in light of how one's
reasonable fear of an apparently dangerous weapon can lead to
deadly retaliation." Courts derive this variation from the Supreme
Court's decision in McLaughlin v. United States, which deemed an
unloaded gun to be a dangerous weapon because "[it] instills fear in
as opposed to apparent, jeopardy).
78. United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (6th Cir. 1971); see also United
States v. Shannahan, 605 F.2d 539, 541 (10th Cir. 1979) (adopting the same framework);
United States v. Kicklighter, 192 F. Supp. 2d 788, 789 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) (same).
79. See United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 767 (10th Cir. 2000) (ruling that a
fake bomb is a dangerous weapon when it gives a victim a reasonable expectation of
danger, regardless of its actual ability to harm).
80. See id. (evidencing the teller's reasonable expectation of injury by noting the bank
robber told her a package was a bomb and he would detonate it if she did not comply).
81. See United States v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635, 639 (10th Cir. 1982)
(emphasizing the victim's reasonable expectation of danger by highlighting his
stating "don't shoot, don't hurt us").
82. United States v. Hargrove, 201 F.3d 966, 968 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877, 882 (4th Cir. 1995)).
83. See United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 152 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he weapon
or device need not actually be capable of inflicting ... injury upon another to be
dangerous, rather, a weapon or device may be considered ... dangerous if it instills
fear in the average citizen creating an immediate danger that a violent response will
follow."). The lower court issued this statement in its jury instructions, and the Third
Circuit affirmed the statement's accuracy. Id.
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the average citizen" and thereby "creates an immediate danger that a
violent response will follow."" Some circuit courts interpret
McLaughlin as implicitly rejecting the objective approach, focusing
instead on how an individual's reasonable fear of a bank robber's
weapon can increase the potential of a violent response." Therefore,
under this subjective approach interpretation, apparent weapons are
usually classified as "dangerous weapons" because of the potential
that police or others will react with deadly or dangerous force."
Similar to the objective approach, the subjective approach has
strengths and weaknesses. First, the prosecution could more easily
satisfy the subjective approach, rather than the objective approach,
since a reasonable person is generally afraid of what appears to be a
weapon.87 The subjective approach also allows courts to respect more
fully the legislative history behind § 2113(d). Congress intended" for
courts to consider an object's potential "to instill fear" as part of the
§ 2113(d) analysis.89  However, some courts disfavor the subjective
approach because a reasonable expectation of fear falls within
§ 2113(a)'s "force or violence or ... intimidation" requirement,
thereby rendering the two sections indistinguishable."
84. 476 U.S. 16, 17-18 (1986).
85. See United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 710 (10th Cir. 1990)
(interpreting McLaughlin as rejecting an objective approach). This court determined
that a victim's reasonable fear of a bank robber's apparently genuine bomb could
have provoked a violent response, which led the court to conclude the fake bomb
was a dangerous weapon. Id. at 709; see also id. at 710 (concluding that the objective
test is not consistent with the possibility that a dangerous response could be evoked
during an armed robbery, regardless of whether the device used is functional);
United States v. Beasley 438 F.2d 1279, 1282 (6th Cir. 1971) (following the subjective
approach and finding that § 2113(a) was satisfied "where the victim ... [was] shown
to have been placed in reasonable apprehension by the robber's conduct, regardless
of the robber's ability actually to inflict harm"); United States v. Benson, 725 F. Supp.
69, 73 n.4 (D. Me. 1989) (interpreting the Supreme Court's ruling in McLaughlin
and finding no intention of using a purely objective test).
86. See United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 152 (3d Cir. 2000) (agreeing that a
fake bomb instilled fear in those who saw it and provoked a police response).
87. See Davis, supra note 8, § 2a (comparing the prosecution's burden under both
the subjective and objective approach and stating that the burden is easier to prove
under the subjective approach).
88. See United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361, 362 (4th Cir. 1972) (refusing to
adopt an objective construction of § 2113(d) so rigid in "application as to make a nullity
of the statute and to rob it of its manifest purpose"); see also Benson, 725 F. Supp. at 73 n.4
(observing that in light of the legislative history and jurisprudence surrounding §
2113(d), Congress probably did not intend a purely objective approach).
89. 78 CONG. REc. 8132 (1934).
90. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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D. United States v. Dixon
A recent Seventh Circuit decision highlights aspects of both the
objective and subjective approaches. In United States v. Dixon, Deangelo
Dixon was convicted twice for armed bank robbery under § 2113(d)
and sentenced to life in prison." In one robbery, Dixon waved a bag
containing a stiff object at tellers threatening, "Five seconds or I'm
gonna shoot."9 2 In the other, Dixon displayed an object with a long
barrel and told a teller to "give him the money or he would shoot.""
The object in both robberies was a long-barreled butane lighter.94
On appeal, Dixon contended that the conviction should have been
under § 2113(a), bank robbery by intimidation, rather than § 2113(d),
armed bank robbery." Dixon specifically argued that the lighter could
not have been a "dangerous weapon or device," regardless of the
tellers' assumptions or beliefs that he had a real gun." Conversely, the
government argued that the lighter should be treated as a dangerous
weapon because the tellers could have believed it was a dangerous
weapon, and the bank guards or police might have opened fire."
To highlight what it thought was the foolishness of the
government's argument, he court reasoned that if the lighter risked
gunfire, so might a finger, a dowel, a water pistol, or a kielbasa in a
pocket." According to the court, the statutory question was whether
Dixon used a "dangerous weapon or device," not whether a guard or
teller mistook a harmless device for a weapon.' The court
elaborated that whether a teller mistook a harmless device for a
weapon would be clear if "Dixon had placed his hand in his pocket
with his finger extended to simulate the barrel of a pistol, or if he had
used six inches of wooden dowel sawed from the end of a broomstick
to simulate a hidden gun barrel."o
Applying the holding of McLaughlin, the court decided that a
lighter does not pose the same threat as an unloaded gun because it
91. 790 F.3d 758, 759 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 425 (2015).





97. Id. at 761. The court specifically noted that the lighter could arguably be
considered a dangerous "device" but did not discuss this notion further because the
government argued it should be treated as a dangerous "weapon." Id. at 760-61.
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does not incite fear in victims, does not create a hostile environment,
and cannot be used as a bludgeon."o' Furthermore, the court noted
that a "hidden stiff object" coupled with a threat may induce fear, but
that fear "differs from a dangerous weapon or device."10 2 The court
ultimately ruled that the statute required an actual dangerous
weapon or device, not something a teller incorrectly believed was
dangerous.'" Accordingly, the court overturned Dixon's convictions
under § 2113(d), leaving him with convictions under § 2113(a).`
II. A CLOSER LOOKAT THE CURRENT § 2113(D) SUBJECTIVE AND
OBJECTIVE FRAMEWORKS
The Dixon decision-which was essentially an example of the
objective approach'-illustrates that either a purely objective or a
purely subjective approach is inadequate to effectively analyze Dixon-
like situations in which someone portrays an object as a weapon to
rob a bank. In Dixon, the objective approach barred a lighter from
qualifying as a dangerous weapon, despite the risk that officers could
respond with deadly force that might have harmed bystanders.106 But
the alternative, the subjective approach, might have been too difficult
to prove because it would have required the court to delve into the
tellers' subjective impressions.0 7
Regardless of the court's approach in Dixon, those faced with an
object that they reasonably believe to be a weapon will likely react as
though the object is, in fact, a weapon. Accordingly, those who attempt
to rob a bank by portraying an object as a weapon deserve § 2113(d)'s
harsher punishment. To ensure this harsher punishment is justly
imposed, courts need a new standard to evaluate Dixon-like situations in
light of § 2113(d). Arriving at this conclusion requires rethinking the
101. Id. (citing McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17-18 (1986)).
102. Id. The court noted a prior decision recognizing that a toy gun might be
dangerous because of its "fear-inducing potential." Id. However, the court said it was
skeptical to hold the same for the lighter because it was not a firearm look-alike. Id.
103. Id. The court queried the outcome in a hypothetical case where a teller was
terrified of rabbits, implying that the subjective approach would require the court to
conclude that rabbits were a "dangerous weapon or device." Id.
104. Id.
105. Although the Seventh Circuit did not use the phrase "objective danger" or
"actual danger," it did decide that "the statute requires a dangerous weapon or
device rather than something a teller believes incorrectly to be dangerous." Id.
Therefore, because the subjective approach encompasses ubjective impressions, it
follows that the Seventh Circuit employed the objective approach.
106. Id. at 760-71.
107. See id. at 761.
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objective approach, exploring the downfalls of a purely subjective
approach, and examining the legislative history of § 2113(d).
A. Rethinking the Objective Approach: "Actual Danger" Can Come from
Sources Other than the Weapon or Device Itself
Although a major aspect of the objective approach focuses on the
ability of the "weapon or device" to cause actual harm, courts have
found that several situations satisfy § 2113(d) even though the
weapon or device itself cannot actually cause harm."os For instance,
recall that courts consistently find that toy guns satisfy § 2113(d).'o A
toy gun cannot literally cause harm; it cannot shoot a real bullet. Due
to its close resemblance to an actual gun, however, courts find that
victims are reasonable in believing that a toy gun is a real gun.'
Similarly, unloaded guns always satisfy § 2113(d), regardless of their
inability to cause actual harm."' Because courts find that toy and
108. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (examining situations where
the weapon or device itself cannot cause harm).
109. E.g., United States v. Garrett, 3 F.3d 390, 391 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam);
United States v. Cannon, 903 F.2d 849, 854-55 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v.
Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1989); cf United States v. DeAngelo,
13 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (8th Cir. 1994) (classifying a starter pistol, a non-firing gun
used to start races, as a dangerous weapon); Martine-fimenez, 864 F.2d at 667
(indicating that an ersatz wooden gun used in a bank robbery would amount to "a
dangerous weapon or device").
110. See United States v. Arafat, 789 F.3d 839, 847 (8th Cir.) (highlighting that the
defendant's toy gun was altered to more closely resemble a genuine gun), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 379 (2015); Martinez-fimenez, 864 F.2d at 668 ("[The defendant's] decision
to bluff [by carrying a toy gun] did not eliminate the harms that Congress intended
to address in § 2113(d)."); United States v. Nixon, No. 12-10232-01-EFM, 2013 WL
2897055, at *2 (D. Kan. June 13, 2013) (acknowledging that every circuit court
adjudicating a situation involving a fake weapon has concluded "that it constitutes a
dangerous weapon for the purposes of the armed robbery statute"); see also Eleanor
Randolph, Toy Guns Can Be Dangerous, for Real, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2015,
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/03/toy-guns-can-be-dangerous-for-
real/?-r=0 (contending that because some toy guns so closely resemble assault rifles,
handguns, and shotguns, they can often fool everyone but a gun expert).
111. See McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17 (1986) (holding that
unloaded guns are dangerous weapons under § 2113(d)). The Court in McLaughlin
noted that an unloaded gun could be used as a bludgeon, so in that capacity, an
unloaded gun itself can harm. However, the Supreme Court listed two other reasons
as to why an unloaded gun is dangerous. Id. at 17-18. One of these other reasons
was that an unloaded gun carries the potential to incite a violent police response. Id.
A violent police response is an independent source of harm other than the unloaded
gun. Therefore, by classifying an unloaded gun as a dangerous weapon due to its
potential to produce a violent response, McLaughlin recognized that harm-or
jeopardy-could arise from a source other than the weapon itself.
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unloaded guns each satisfy § 2113(d) based on the potential for police
or bank guards to open fire in response, a source of danger
independent from an actual unloaded or toy gun, the potential harms
a device creates can satisfy § 2113(d)'sjeopardy requirement.112
B. Drawbacks of a Purely Subjective Approach: Fear Alone Is Not Enough
The purely subjective approach is also problematic when dealing with
a bank robbery involving an apparent weapon. Specifically, a purely
subjective approach does not distinguish between § 2113(d) and (a).
Because bank robbery is, by definition, bank larceny plus force, violence,
or intimidation, § 2113(d) must require something more than force,
fear, threat, or intimidation to distinguish the two provisions."'
A simple examination of the statute indicates the two sections must
be separated. Namely, § 2113(d) has a steeper penalty than (a)."'
The statute also differentiates between robberies committed using
force, violence, or intimidation and robberies committed with a
dangerous weapon or device."' These separate qualifications
indicate that Congress intended to distinguish § 2113(d) and (a), as
it enacted two subsections with different requirements and
penalties."' Consequently, using the subjective approach and
allowing a witness's subjective impressions to satisfy the jeopardy
requirement of § 2113(d) would conflate two offenses that Congress
intended to differentiate.
A purely subjective approach poses another difficulty: it requires the
prosecution to delve into the subjective reactions of victims. For
112. See Martinez-fimenez, 864 F.2d at 666 (explaining that the dangerousness of
a device or weapon used in a bank robbery is not only a function of its potential
to harm directly).
113. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. It is important to remember
that the subjective approach mentioned throughout this Comment is specific to §
2113(d), not § 2113(a).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1970)
(declaring that if § 2113(d) did not require lives to be objectively in danger, it would
be impossible to differentiate between subsections (a) and (d)); see also James F.
Ponsoldt, A Due Process Analysis ofJudicially-Authorized Presumptions in Federal Aggravated
Bank Robbery Cases, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 368-69 (1983) (explaining that
under the subjective approach, the minimum requirements of § 2113(a), with
nothing more, also satisfy § 2113(d)).
115. See supra note 31 (comparing § 2113(a) and § 2113(d)).
116. United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2001).
117. Cf United States v. Nixon, No. 12-10232-01-EFM, 2013 WL 2897055, at *2 (D.
Kan.June 13, 2013) (explaining that a distinction between 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006)
and 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) cannot be eroded because Congress enacted these different
statutes, with different provisions and punishments, for a good reason).
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example, a bank robber could encounter a teller who is courageous or
insensitive."' Conversely, a bank teller could be overly fearful, having a
phobia that causes an irrational belief that something inherently
harmless is dangerous."' Section 2113(d) should not require the
prosecution to explore and amplify a victim's reaction to apparently
dangerous articles because individuals all react differently under
different circumstances.'20 Also, a defendant who satisfies § 2113(d)'s
requirements should not escape a harsher punishment simply because a
victim turned out to be too brave.121 A purely subjective approach that
requires investigating subjective reactions is problematic because
individuals inevitably have different personal impressions and reactions,
resulting in a standard that courts cannot apply consistently.22
Not only is delving into witnesses' subjective reactions complicated,
the subjective approach leads to an almost certain § 2113(d)
conviction. The subjective approach requires a weapon or device to
produce a reasonable expectation of danger, and common sense
suggests that everyone becomes afraid of injury when facing a bank
robber wielding a weapon.123  This approach therefore seems to
automatically generate a conviction with minimal analysis, which is
troublesome because criminal statutes impose severe punishments and
must strike a proper balance between fairness to the defendant and
118. See United States v. Brown, 412 F.2d 381, 382 (8th Cir. 1969) (involving a
situation where a bank teller boldly stood up to a bank robber by screaming, "Show
me your gun, you little snot, or get out of here"); see asoJohn Johnson, Alleged Bank
Robbery Attempt Fails Spectacularly, NEWSER (July 10, 2016, 4:45 PM),
http://www.newser.com/story/227890/alleged-bank-robbery-attempt-fails-spectacula
rly.html (reporting on a bank robbery where a teller refused to hand over any money
despite the bank robber's use of a shotgun).
119. E.g., United States v. Dixon, 790 F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir.) (posing a hypothetical
of a bank teller being terrified of rabbits), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 425 (2015).
120. United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279, 1282 (6th Cir. 1971).
121. See id. ("[A] defendant against whom the requisite elements of the offense
have been proved will not be absolved on the fortuity that his victim was too
courageous or insensitive to be afraid [of a bank robber].").
122. See Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical
Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and
Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 4 (1998) (critiquing a purely subjective
criminal law approach by explaining that subjective standards of reasonableness are
antithetical to the "fundamental principle" that the law "should be based on a
generally accepted standard of conduct applicable to all citizens alike").
123. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17-18 (1986) (asserting
that the mere display of a gun "instills fear in the average citizen"); cf United States
v. Hernandez, 232 F. App'x 561, 566 (6th Cir. 2007) (determining that the mere
display of a bomb "instills fear in the average citizen").
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obtaining justice.' Thus, a purely subjective approach seems to
undermine the criminal justice system's fundamental notion of fairness
by allowing a stilted analysis that virtually always leads to conviction.2 1
C. Congress Intended Something Less than a Purely Objective Approach to
Govern § 2113(d) Analysis
Although a purely subjective approach is problematic, Congress
did not want a purely objective approach to govern § 2113(d).126 The
floor debate on this section indicates that Congress was concerned that
courts would not consider an object's potential to incite fear when
deciding whether that object is a "dangerous weapon."'2  Ultimately,
Congress believed that adding the phrase "or device" to the section
would specifically encompass objects with fear-inducing qualities,12 8
essentially mirroring the subjective approach's reasoning.'2 9
Congress's desire to include "fear-inducing objects" indicates an
intention for something less than a purely objective approach
because the objective approach disregards impressions of fear.
D. The Need for a New § 2113(d) Approach When Individuals Rob Banks
with Apparent Weapons
The intricacies and problems of both the objective and subjective
approaches indicate the need for a new approach to govern Dixon-
like situations: situations in which a bank robber brandishes an
object as a weapon. Of course, arguing for a new approach implies
that inherently harmless objects used to rob banks should fall within
124. See United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 125 (3d Cir. 1981) (asserting that
"repose and fairness for defendants" are historically fundamental aspects of the
criminal justice system).
125. Cf Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 65 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(contending that, in the context of the vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute could
be unconstitutional in regard to the "applicable tests to ascertain guilt").
126. See supra Section I.B; see also United States v. Benson, 725 F. Supp. 69, 73 n.4
(D. Me. 1989) (speculating that "it is unlikely, in light of the legislative history of [§]
2113(d) [,] ... that the United States Congress intended a purely objective test").
127. 78 CONG. REc. 8132 (1934) (statement of Rep. Blanton). Representative
Blanton noted specifically, "Some of the largest bank robberies have been
occasioned where a thug comes into the bank and goes up to the window and has a
bottle" of liquid, asserting that it is nitroglycerin. Id.
128. Id. An example Representative Blanton gave of a fear-inducing object was a
wooden gun. Id. Representative Dockweiler even suggested amending § 2113(d) by
adding the phrase "device or such instrumentality intended to instill fear." Id. However,
Representative Blanton responded by saying, "'[0] r device' would cover [it]." Id.
129. See supra Section I.C.2.b (detailing the subjective approach reasoning, which
involves an individual's reasonable expectation or fear of injury).
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§ 2113(d)'s purview. These objects should fall within § 2113(d) if a
bank robber brandishes an inherently harmless object as a weapon.
After all, this situation occurred in Dixon, where Dixon used a long-
barreled lighter as a gun.3 o Individuals who use objects as weapons
to rob banks deserve § 2113(d)'s harsher punishment, so long as it is
reasonable to believe the object is an actual weapon. This reasonable
belief would likely cause victims, police, or bank guards to react in
the same way as if faced with a real weapon.'3 '
Individuals exposed to what they reasonably believe to be a dangerous
weapon would also be exposed to some of the same risks as if the robber
were using an actual weapon. The apparent weapon could create a risk
of retaliatory gunfire, which immediately causes the atmosphere to
become hostile.' 2  This risk of retaliatory gunfire evidences that §
2113(d)'s jeopardy requirement can stem from sources other than an
actual "dangerous weapon or device" itself. Since § 2113(d) can be
interpreted in light of the harms created, it is plausible for an inherently
harmless object-such as a long-barreled lighter-to satisfy § 2113(d), as
long as victims reasonably believe the object is an actual weapon. As
mentioned, using a purely objective or a purely subjective approach in
this situation would be ineffective.' Therefore, to determine whether a
bank robber who uses an object as a weapon deserves § 2113(d)
punishment, courts should apply a hybrid standard that effectively
incorporates both subjective and objective factors.'
130. See supra Section I.D (summarizing the facts in Dixon). Additionally, a
number of courts have analyzed ordinary robbery-not bank robbery-situations
where individuals use simulated weapons, such as a finger or other object simulating
a gun. See generally Lynn C. Cobb, Annotation, Robbery by Means of Toy or Simulated
Gun or Pistol, 81 A.L.R.3d 1006 (1977 & Supp. 2010) (detailing numerous robbery
situations where defendants used simulated weapons).
131. Cf 78 CONG. REc. 8132 (1934) (statement of Rep. Blanton) (arguing that a
bottle of water asserted to be nitroglycerin would have the same psychological effect
as a real bottle of nitroglycerin).
132. See United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d 664, 668 (9th Cir. 1989)
(noting that confrontations between police and robbers armed with replica or
simulated guns "often lead to gunfire and casualties").
133. See Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man: Getting Over the
Subjectivity/Objectivity Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 33, 35-36 (2008) (arguing that
purely subjective and purely objective approaches are undesirable).
134. See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 830 (9th ed. 2012) (describing a hybrid approach that "individualizes the
objective standard," implying that hybrid standards contain both objective and
subjective factors).
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III. APPLYING A HYBRID STANDARD TO § 2113(D) WILL BETTER
ENCOMPASS SITUATIONS IN WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL USES AN OBJECT
PURPORTED TO BE AN ACTUAL WEAPON DURING A BANK ROBBERY
Broadly speaking, a hybrid framework incorporating both
subjective and objective factors provides a more balanced
approach."' A hybrid approach would serve as an effective § 2113(d)
framework for analyzing instances in which a bank robber brandishes
an object as a weapon because an inherently harmless object fails the
objective approach and, as mentioned, the purely subjective
approach is too problematic.
A. The Hybrid Approach
The proposed hybrid approach considers whether a reasonable
person in a bank robbery victim's position would perceive the
situation as one involving an actual weapon.'3 6  This standard
contemplates several elements: (1) whether there was a display or
gesture in a manner consistent with possessing an actual weapon, (2)
whether the defendant used threats to indicate the displayed object
was a real weapon, (3) whether the defendant had the intent to
portray the object as a weapon, and (4) whether the defendant used
the object in a way that produced a charged and hostile atmosphere.
If a court finds that a reasonable person in the victim's situation
would have believed that the bank robber wielded an object that was
an actual weapon after considering all of these elements, then
§ 2113(d)'s harsher punishment should apply. Examining each
element in turn will better illustrate the applicability of the approach
to situations like the one that occurred in Dixon.
135. See Nourse, supra note 133, at 35-36 (describing criminal law hybrid
standards as reflecting "common sense"). Taken to extremes, a purely subjective
approach requires deciding what is reasonable under the circumstances, which
requires considering the norms of a specific individual. Id. Alternatively, a purely
objective standard bars consideration of relevant facts surrounding a defendant or
victim, such as whether that victim was blind or a child. Id. A more sound approach
considers both subjective and objective factors. Id.
136. This standard is derived from hybrid approaches abundant throughout
criminal law. See id. at 36 ("[T]he Model Penal Code and a majority ofjurisdictions
adopt some form of 'hybrid' standard: the jury must judge the defendant by the
standards of the reasonable person, but the reasonable person in the 'situation."').
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1. Did the bank robber make a gesture or display an object in a manner
consistent with an actual weapon?
For a teller to reasonably believe that an object is a weapon, a bank
robber must indicate in some manner that the object is, in fact, a
weapon.'7 A crucial way for a bank robber to indicate that the object is
a weapon is to gesture with or display the object in a manner consistent
with how one would brandish an actual weapon.' While a bank robber
who alludes to having a weapon likely creates apprehension, a robber
who displays an object or simulated weapon creates even greater
apprehension because he now has the apparent capability to harm.'
A display or gesture is necessary because without one a bank
robber has not "used" a "dangerous weapon," as required by
§ 2113(d).' Keeping an apparent weapon concealed during a bank
robbery would not amount to "use," it would only amount to
"possession," which does not trigger § 2113(d)."' Further, keeping a
simulated weapon concealed would be less likely to create a charged
atmosphere because police or guards do not have to contemplate
additional actions, such as whether to return fire, on the basis that a
137. See United States v. Odom, 329 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that a
"common denominator" among robbers convicted under § 2113(d) is that they
"knowingly made one or more victims at the scene aware that" they were armed with
a real or fake gun).
138. A gesture or display in a manner consistent with an actual weapon can take
on many forms. See United States v. Benson, 918 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1990)
(concerning a defendant who moved his hand in his jacket pocket, partially exposing
a metallic object the teller believed was a gun); United States v. Roustio, 455 F.2d
366, 368, 371-72 (7th Cir. 1972) (involving a defendant who gave a teller a note stating
that he had a gun and who then partially displayed the gun to the teller while it was still
tucked in his waistband); State v. Elam, 312 So. 2d 318, 322 (La. 1975) (chronicling a
situation where, during an ordinary robbery, a defendant kept one hand inside his
jacket pocket and motioned in a manner indicating he had a weapon).
139. Brief for Respondent at 19-20, McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16
(1986) (No. 85-5189), 1985 WL 670258, at *19-20; see also McLaughlin, 476 U.S. at
17-18 (concluding that a display of a gun leads to increased apprehension of injury).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (2012); see also Odom, 329 F.3d at 1035 (determining that
an intentional display of a gun qualifies as "use" under § 2113(d)); United States v.
Ray, 21 F.3d 1134, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (ruling that a "criminal must, during the
commission of the bank robbery, in some manner display an object reasonably
perceived as capable of inflicting bodily harm"); United States v. Perry, 991 F.2d 304,
308 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that the display of a toy or wooden gun during a bank
robbery constitutes "use").
141. See, e.g., Perry, 991 F.2d at 309-10 (concluding that "use" clearly connotes
something more than mere "possession," and that Congress had the opportunity to
create an enhanced statutory penalty for mere possession of a gun but declined to do so).
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bank robber is armed.'2 Overall, a display or gesture consistent with
using an actual weapon contributes to a solid reasonable belief that an
object is a real weapon because victims would have a concrete basis-the
display or gesture-upon which to form their reasonable belief.
2. Did the robber couple a gesture or display with threats uggesting that the
object was a genuine weapon?
A display or gesture coupled with a threat indicating the object was
a weapon would further heighten a reasonable belief that the object
was actually a weapon."' To begin, a mere threat would not suffice as
courts consistently find that threats or words alone do not qualify as a
"dangerous weapon or device.""' Additionally, only alluding to a
weapon would likely be enough to satisfy § 2113(a)'s "force and
violence, or intimidation" requirements.14 5 If, however, words alone
were enough to satisfy § 2113(d), then the same problem created by
the purely subjective test remains: threats alone would make §
2113(a) and (d) indistinguishable."' Moreover, should threats alone
142. See id. at 309 (concluding that a concealed weapon would not render a deadly
or extreme police response and would not pose any greater risk to victims,
bystanders, or police).
143. Threats indicating an object is a weapon can take various forms. See United
States v. Jones, 84 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving a defendant who gave a
teller a note reading, "This is a robbery. I have a gun. Don't push any alarms. And
don't want dye packs"); United States v. Benson, 918 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1990)
(concerning a situation in which a robber told a teller that "this is a hold up" and
that he had a gun).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding
that threatening words and gestures alone do not constitute a dangerous device
under § 2113(d)). But see Jones, 84 F.3d at 1211 (convicting a defendant who told
tellers he had a gun, but never revealed the gun). However, in Jones, the court
determined that the reference to the gun during the robbery amounted to more
than a threat because a gun was later found in the defendant's possession. Id.
145. See United States v. Ray, 21 F.3d 1134, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (determining
that threatening words might satisfy § 2113(a) but do not amount to a "dangerous
device" under § 2113(d)).
146. See Wolfe, 245 F.3d at 262 (concluding that permitting a mere threat of
violence to count as a dangerous device would effectively circumvent legislation
designed to deter criminals who commit crimes while armed with a weapon or
dangerous device); see also Ray, 21 F.3d at 1140 ("To treat . .. [threats] as also
satisfying the use-of-a-dangerous-device lement in § 2113(d) would be to merge the
two sections together when Congress meant them to remain apart."). But see United
States v. Ferguson, 211 F.3d 878, 883 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[W]hen a defendant
announces that he possesses a gun during a robbery, ajury may reasonably infer that
the defendant actually possessed a gun."); Jones, 84 F.3d at 1211 (same); Ray, 21 F.3d
at 1141 n.11 (same). However, as previously mentioned, § 2113(d) requires "use,"
not possession of a weapon or device. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (2012) (requiring a bank
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constitute a "dangerous device," the prosecution would only have to
prove a bank robber claimed to have a weapon, not that he actually
had a weapon.14 To remain consistent with case law, the hybrid
approach requires a threat to accompany a display or gesture.
3. Did the robber have the subjective intent to brandish the object as a
weapon?
By using an object as a weapon, a bank robber believes that his
victims will think the object is a dangerous weapon;"' the robber's
belief therefore justifies a victim's reasonable belief. Someone
subjectively intending"' to brandish an object as a weapon will likely
do everything possible to convince victims that the object is an actual
weapon,15 0 as weapons are integral to bank robberies.15 1 Otherwise,
the bank robber might not be able to force victims to comply with his
commands, which is necessary for a successful bank robbery.'
A bank robber might try to negate his subjective intent by making
statements indicating that he did not want anyone to believe the
robber to place one's life in jeopardy by "the use of a dangerous weapon or device")
(emphasis added).
147. Wolfe, 245 F.3d at 261.
148. See Melissa Ellen Dyan, Dangerousness I in the Eye of the Beholder-United States
v. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F2d 664 (9th Cir. 1989), 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1141, 1145
(1989) (examining Martinez-fimenez and concluding that a robber carrying a toy gun
wants victims to believe it is a real gun).
149. The robber's subjective intent referred to in this section is not to be confused
with the subjective approach mentioned above, which considers the subjective
reaction of a bank robbery victim.
150. See United States v. Benson, 725 F. Supp. 69, 72 (D. Me. 1989) (concluding
that the defendant "intended and succeeded in using the silver knife in his pocket as
a mock gun in order to scare the teller into providing him with bank funds"), affd,
918 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
151. See United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1989)
(noting a robber's testimony that he carried a toy gun because he "felt secure with it"
and suggested he might not have begun the robbery without it); see also United States
v. Dobbins, No. 96-4233, 1998 WL 598717, at *6 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 1998) (expressing
that the defendant's gun was "not tangentially related" to the bank robbery because
guns are an integral part of the act).
152. In the context of guns, courts allow the jury to infer a gun is loaded because a
bank robber who displays a gun wants his victims to believe it is loaded. See, e.g.,
Morrow v. United States, 408 F.2d 1390, 1391 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding that pointing
shotguns at employees to back up demands is sufficient evidence that the robbers
wanted the employees to believe the guns were loaded). Similarly, a bank robber
wielding an object as a weapon likely wants his victims to believe it is actually a
weapon that can harm. See Benson, 725 F. Supp. at 72 (describing a situation in which
a defendant "intended and succeeded in using the silver knife in his pocket" as a
"mock gun").
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robbery involved a real weapon.1 5' However, such statements could
be self-serving, meaning that a robber might say anything to lessen or
escape punishment.1 5' The hybrid approach also alleviates this
concern because it considers contextual factors, such as whether the
robber threatened or displayed the object in a weapon-like manner
that could corroborate the robber's subjective intent to wield the
object as a weapon. Overall, identifying the bank robber's subjective
intent to brandish an object as a weapon is important to consider
because if the robber successfully convinces victims the object is a
weapon, their compliance with the robber's demands supports a
reasonable belief that the object is a real weapon.
4. Did the manner in which the object was used produce a charged and
hostile environment?
A reasonable belief that a bank robber is wielding a genuine
weapon does not require that the object be an actual weapon: a teller
will likely react to both in the same way, and such a situation would
likely create a hostile environment."' Recall that courts find that toy
guns and unloaded guns create the risk that police or bank guards
will respond to a bank robbery with deadly force.'5 6 Officers must
also formulate quick and therefore less efficient responses to a
situation that poses a threat to human life.'15  Such rushed decisions
153. See Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 665 (containing a codefendant's statement
that neither he nor the other defendant wanted the bank employees to believe that
they were using a real gun and that they did not want the bank employees to be
fearful for their lives).
154. See United States v. Ramirez, No. 90-10622, 1991 WL 144550, at *2 n.1 (9th
Cir. Aug. 1, 1991) (allowing the district court "to disbelieve the [defendant's] self-
serving statements denying that he had ever had a gun, even a fake one, at any of the
robberies to which he pleaded guilty"); United States v. Cannon, 903 F.2d 849, 854
(1st Cir. 1990) (indicating that a defendant's statements regarding whether he used
a toy gun during a robbery were self-serving to some extent and the jury could have
rejected them); United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1970)
(classifying a defendant's statement that he "took the shell out of the chamber so
nobody could get hurt while [he] was in the bank," as "entirely self-serving").
155. See Martine-fimenez, 864 F.2d at 666 (noting that a bank robber carrying a toy
gun forces his victims to feel apprehensive).
156. See supra Section I.C.1; see alsoJohn F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity,
and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REv. 241, 307 (2002)
(suggesting that, based on the McLaughlin decision, an apparent weapon brings
dangers beyond just those normally associated with a bank robbery).
157. MartinezJimenez, 864 F.2d at 666-67.
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create the potential for a bystander, bank employee, or the bank
robber himself to be caught in the crossfire. 15
These sources of injury will likely also exist when the bank robber is
using an apparent weapon, as long as police and victims reasonably
believe the object is a genuine weapon.'15  To illustrate, individuals
who alert authorities to the situation will relay information based on
whether they believe that the bank robber's object is an actual
weapon. Bank guards and police officers will likely respond with
deadly force if witness information or their own assessment leads
them to believe that the robber has a weapon, real or not.
Consequently, if victims reasonably believe the object is a real gun, then
the atmosphere will likely turn hostile or adverse, which would further
corroborate a reasonable belief that the object is a real weapon.
B. Distilling the Hybrid Approach
All of the previously discussed elements aim to establish whether it
was reasonable under the circumstances for a witness to believe that
the bank robber was wielding a weapon during the robbery. The
hybrid standard must have a high threshold to determine that a
victim had a reasonable belief because it seems counterintuitive to
convict a defendant of "armed bank robbery" for using an inherently
harmless object to rob a bank. Also, the reasonableness of this belief
is paramount to striking a proper balance between enhancing a
robber's punishment when appropriate and remaining fair to the
defendant.'" Moreover, this belief must be reasonable because
allowing an inherently harmless object to satisfy § 2113(d) seems to
defy its plain language: jeopardizing someone with a dangerous
weapon or device.1 "' Allowing harsher punishment for inherently
harmless objects could blur the lines between armed and unarmed
bank robbery."' Considering all these concerns, the hybrid approach
158. See Decker, supra note 156, at 307 (noting that the use of what "appears to be
a dangerous weapon" increases the danger to innocent bystanders because a security
guard would feel justified in using deadly force).
159. Id. (interpreting McLaughlin and concluding that apparently dangerous
weapons create increased risks).
160. Cf United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 125 (3d Cir. 1981) (emphasizing
that "repose and fairness for defendants" are historically fundamental to the criminal
justice system).
161. One notion regarding § 2113(d) is that "common sense" leads to the
conclusion that life must be in actual danger. United States v. Burger, 419 F.2d 1293,
1294 (5th Cir. 1969).
162. See Dyan, supra note 148, at 1146-47 (arguing that after McLaughlin, courts
could characterize ineffectual weapons as dangerous and render § 2113(d)'s
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necessitates a strong reasonable belief that an object is a weapon,
based on all circumstances surrounding the situation.
Courts should require prosecutors to establish all elements to
satisfy the hybrid standard. However, considering each element
independently takes away from the overall flexible nature of a hybrid
approach.'63  Courts should examine each element in light of the
others because the elements are interrelated and build on one
another. To illustrate, a threat alone does not satisfy the proposed
hybrid approach. But a threat paired with a display or gesture
heightens one's reasonable belief that the object is a weapon. Further,
a bank robber displaying and using the object to threaten others in a
manner consistent with a genuine weapon evidences the robber's
subjective intent to portray that object as a gun.'" Finally, if a victim
maintains a reasonable belief the object is a gun, the entire situation
becomes hostile with the potential for deadly consequences."
As illustrated, each element builds on the others; however, the
most important factor would be whether the object creates a highly
charged atmosphere. The highly charged atmosphere, with the risk
of violent retaliation, is the source from which § 2113(d) derives its
jeopardy requirement. The "highly charged atmosphere" element is
key in determining if individuals are exposed to jeopardy through the
use of a "dangerous weapon or device."1"
dangerous weapon requirement virtually meaningless). Dyan notes that there are
valid public policy reasons to support courts concluding that toy weapons are
dangerous, but she argues that these reasons do not justify expanding what
constitutes dangerous weapons, necessitating a literal construction of § 2113(d) to
protect a defendant's rights. See id.; cf Ponsoldt, supra note 114, at 382-83 (arguing
that there is a significant distinction between unloaded guns and toy guns in terms of
allowing the jury to infer a gun is loaded).
163. See Nourse, supra note 133, at 36 (explaining that the subjective aspects of a
hybrid approach allow "standard-like flexibility").
164. See United States v. Benson, 725 F. Supp. 69, 72 (D. Me. 1989) (noting that
the defendant "intended and succeeded" in using a knife as a "mock gun"), affd, 918
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
165. See United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d 664, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1989)
(asserting that the bank robbery victims were fearful they would be harmed because
they believed the toy gun was real).
166. See Baker v. United States, 412 F.2d 1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1969) (concluding
the capacity of a gun to harm, combined with a highly charged atmosphere, and the
possibility of employees and others trying to prevent the robbery, is a "complex of
circumstances" jeopardizing individuals in one of various ways). The same notion is
applicable in a situation where an object is believed to be a weapon; people will react
the same way as when faced with a real weapon, creating the same "complex of
circumstances" that can jeopardize them. Id.
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C. Possible Critiques of the Hybrid Approach
Like any criminal law standard, the hybrid approach has potential
flaws. Critics will likely argue that an object portrayed as a weapon is
incapable of actually jeopardizing anyone as required by § 2113(d).
The hybrid approach, however, focuses on the harms stemming from
using an object as a weapon and not the ability of the object itself to
actually harm."' Though it may seem absurd to classify an inherently
harmless object as a "dangerous weapon or device," an object that
one reasonably believes is a weapon can still amplify the
dangerousness of a bank robbery. Considering any additional harms
created when a bank robber wields an object is crucial because those
who subject others to high risks of injury during a bank robbery
deserve harsher punishment.'t s
Another critique of the hybrid standard involves a victim's
perceptions of the apparent weapon. Defendants have argued that
victims faced with apparent weapons become so fearful that they
cannot distinguish between a harmless object and a gun, rendering
§ 2113(d) inapplicable. Arguably, a victim should be able to
distinguish between a real weapon and a harmless object.' The
hybrid approach considers this argument. Because the hybrid
approach considers whether a victim's belief is reasonable, it is
important to remember that a victim's perceptions during a robbery
can be impaired.'70 A bank robbery is a precarious situation with
167. The hybrid approach focusing on the harms created is derived from Martinez-
Jimenez, which concluded that § 2113(d) focuses on the harms created, not the
manner creating the harm. 864 F.2d at 666. Because objects purported to be guns
are inherently harmless, the "jeopardy" necessary under § 2113(d) must be derived
from the entire situation. Id.
168. After all, the purpose of the Federal Bank Robbery Act is to severely punish
people for committing crimes against banks and deterring persons from attempting
those crimes. 78 CONG. REc. 8148 (1934) (statement of Rep. Glover) (stating that
the bill's purpose was to "provide[] a punishment that will deter anyone from
attempting bank robbery").
169. See United States v. Roach, 321 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1963) (involving an
argument suggesting it was likely that the teller was so overcome with fear that she
was unable to distinguish a gun from a gloved hand); see aso Martinez-fimenez, 864
F.2d at 667 (rejecting the appellant's argument that testimony surrounding a teller's
fear was based on the mistaken assessment of an apparent threat).
170. See Martinezfimenez, 864 F.2d at 667 (explaining that people faced with what
they believe to be a deadly weapon "cannot be expected to maintain a high level of
critical perception"); see also United States v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635, 639 (10th Cir.
1982) (indicating it would be unreasonable to expect a victim of a robbery to risk his
life to positively ensure that a robber did indeed have a functional weapon); cf Baker
v. United States, 412 F.2d 1069, 1071-72 (5th Cir. 1969) (explaining that guns are
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fears of injury, or even death. Victims-faced with what they believe
to be an actual weapon-are under immense pressure because of the
apparent threat of harm. Accordingly, the reasonable belief that the
object is a weapon creates the same fear of injury as would a real
weapon, and victims cannot always be expected to make accurate
assessments of the situation in light of this apprehension.
D. Reanalyzing United States v. Dixon Under the Hybrid Approach
The Seventh Circuit would likely have affirmed Dixon's § 2113(d)
convictions under the proposed hybrid approach. Recall that the
Seventh Circuit decided that the lighter Dixon used did not
constitute a dangerous weapon."' The prosecution's argument
essentially mirrored certain components of the hybrid standard: the
tellers reasonably believed an object-the lighter-was a gun, and the
object had the potential to invoke a violent response."7 Ignoring this
argument, the Seventh Circuit instead used the objective approach:
the proper analysis was not whether the tellers mistakenly believed
the lighter was a weapon, but whether the lighter was actually a
weapon.173  While mentioning that the lighter might have been
considered a "dangerous device," the court barely discussed how
Dixon brandished the lighter as a gun.17 However, Dixon did
brandish the lighter as a gun-the exact situation that the proposed
hybrid standard encompasses-and a reasonable person in the
teller's position likely would have perceived the situation as one
involving a real gun.
First, Dixon satisfied both the "threat" and "display" elements of
the hybrid test by making gestures, displays, and threats all in a
manner indicating the lighter was a real gun. While robbing one bank,
Dixon waved a bag containing a "stiff object" at tellers and threatened
commonly known and treated as dangerous and a person confronted with a gun
would still think it was dangerous without knowing whether there was a round in the
chamber). Similarly, a person confronted with an object he or she believed to be a
weapon would perceive the object as dangerous until he or she learned otherwise.
171. See United States v. Dixon, 790 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that
the long-barreled lighter could have been considered a dangerous device but not a
dangerous weapon), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 425 (2015).
172. See id. at 761 (recounting the prosecution's argument).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 760-61. The court mentioned briefly that whether the teller mistook
the lighter for a gun would have been clear if Dixon had pointed his finger
simulating a gun or used a wooden dowel to simulate a gun barrel. Id. However, the
court did not extensively comment on the fact that Dixon was actually brandishing
the lighter as a gun.
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them saying, "Five seconds or I'm gonna shoot."75 While robbing
another bank, Dixon brandished the long-barreled lighter and
directed a teller to "give him the money or he would shoot."'7  Dixon
also pressed the lighter against a teller's neck while simultaneously
threatening to shoot.7 7 These gestures and threats to "shoot" could
have implied only one thing: that Dixon had a gun. A teller who feels
a cold, barrel-like object against the back of her neck, while also
hearing the word "shoot," would probably immediately believe the
encounter involved a real gun. All of the threats and gestures Dixon
made were consistent with how one would brandish an actual gun,
satisfying the "threat" and "gesture" prongs of the hybrid approach.
Second, Dixon also satisfied the "subjective intent" element of the
hybrid approach, as a court could reasonably infer that Dixon
intended to brandish the lighter as a firearm based on his threats,
gestures, and displays. Primarily, his threats to "shoot" strongly
indicate his intent to brandish the lighter as a gun. Had Dixon
wanted to rob the bank using the lighter as a lighter, he likely would
have threatened to bum the teller or set the bank on fire. Instead, he
threatened to "shoot," which is specific to a gun. Further, if he wanted
to use the lighter as a lighter, he probably would not have concealed it
in the bag. Dixon keeping the lighter in the bag indicates that he did
not want the tellers to know he only had a lighter, and instead wanted
the tellers to infer it was a gun. Dixon also pressed the lighter's barrel
to a teller's neck. While this act alone could indicate Dixon wanted to
use the lighter as a lighter, Dixon simultaneously threatened to
"shoot."' This combination of actions clearly evinces his intent to
brandish the lighter as a gun. Because Dixon did not use the lighter
in a manner consistent with an actual lighter and instead used the
lighter in a manner consistent with an actual gun, his subjective
intent was likely to brandish the lighter as a gun.
Finally, Dixon's use of the lighter likely satisfies the "hostile
environment" element, although it is unclear from the opinion. The
court responded to the prosecution's "risk of gunfire" argument by
stating that " [ilf the lighter risked gunfire, so might a finger in a
pocket or a dowel in a pocket or a water pistol in a pocket or even a
kielbasa in a pocket.""' The court's hypothetical commentary
175. Id. at 760.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 760-61. The opinion does not indicate during which robbery this occurred.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 761.
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indicates that it was either skeptical or did not consider thatjeopardy
can stem from sources other than the object itself."so The court also
did not consider the possibility that tellers or guards would likely
have reacted the same way to a kielbasa-or the lighter-if they
reasonably believed it was a gun. While the opinion does not indicate
that police or bank guards opened fire, the possibility of a deadly
response still existed, assuming the tellers reasonably believed the
lighter was actually a gun."' Overall, if the tellers or guards
reasonably believed the lighter was a gun, then police or guard
retaliatory measures would likely have included deadly force,
satisfying § 2113(d)'s jeopardy requirement.
The hybrid standard would eradicate the need to delve into the
tellers' subjective intricacies. Responding to the prosecution's
argument that the tellers reasonably believed the lighter was
dangerous, the court hypothesized of a teller being terrified of
rabbits, implying that rabbits could be considered "dangerous
weapons."1 8 2  The hybrid approach effectively reconciles this
seemingly absurd reasoning. Because the hybrid standard calls for a
reasonable person in the victim's situation and details the specific
elements-displays, gestures, threats, robber intent, and hostile
situation-to consider, it necessarily eliminates having to examine
any specific subjective features of a victim herself. To illustrate, a
victim's phobia of rabbits would not be considered because the
elements focus on the situation objectively and how a reasonable teller
in that specific situation would experience them. Put another way, the
approach views a totality of the circumstances to determine the
reasonableness of the teller's belief that the lighter was a gun. A fear
of rabbits is extremely subjective, and a person with a phobia of
rabbits would likely fall outside the hybrid's "reasonable person"
standard. Conversely, a fear of a gun or weapon will almost always be
reasonable.' Therefore, the hybrid approach would still consider
180. The court specifically articulated that the McLaughlin characteristics, as to why
an unloaded gun is dangerous, do not apply to a kielbasa. See id. (outlining the
McLaughlin opinion and stating that "[n]one of these things is true about a kielbasa").
181. Case law indicates that a violent response does not actually have to occur,
merely that there is an increased risk that a violent response could occur. See
McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 18 (1986) (ruling that an unloaded gun
creates an immediate danger of a violent response).
182. Dixon, 790 F.3d at 761.
183. See McLaughlin, 476 U.S. at 17 (noting that a "gun is an article that is typically
and characteristically dangerous; the use for which it is manufactured and sold is a
dangerous one"); United States v. Arafat, 789 F.3d 839, 847 (8th Cir. 2015)
(highlighting that guns instill fear in average citizens), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 379
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subjective qualities in a sense, but it considers those subjective
qualities of a reasonable person in the situation, not the
idiosyncrasies of each individual victim.
The Seventh Circuit adhered to the purely objective standard when
analyzing whether the lighter was a dangerous weapon, but the
hybrid approach renders a different outcome. The tellers likely had
a reasonable belief that the lighter was a gun based on Dixon's
gestures and threats, creating the potential for a violent response
placing everyone in jeopardy, as § 2113(d) requires. Essentially,
analyzing Dixon under the hybrid approach would likely have caused
the Seventh Circuit to affirm Dixon's § 2113(d) convictions.
IV. A RECOMMENDED REWORDING OF § 2113(D)
Considering the language of § 2113(d), a harmless object
brandished as a weapon cannot literally be defined as a "dangerous
weapon or device."'1  However, a specific rewording of the section
could encompass situations such as the one in Dixon. Section
2113(d) could be reworded to address that issue:
Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense
defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any
person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of an
actual dangerous weapon or device, or by any object, which the user
intended to convince his or her victim was a gun or other weapon and did
so convince the victim, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than twenty-five years, or both.
The above language would encompass situations that the hybrid
approach aims to analyze, and under this language, the Dixon
(2015).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (2012).
185. This language is derived from the Kentucky Supreme Court's interpretation
of a Kentucky regular armed robbery statute. See Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386
S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ky. 1965) ("We hold that within the context of this [armed
robbery] statute any object that is intended by its user to convince the victim that it is
a pistol or other deadly weapon and does so convince him is one."). Indeed, many
state courts and state statutes contemplate objects purported to be weapons used
during an ordinary robbery. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-302 (1) (d) (2013)
(proscribing aggravated robbery, which occurs when a defendant "possesses any
article used or fashioned in a manner to lead any person who is present reasonably
to believe it to be a deadly weapon or represents verbally or otherwise that he is then
and there so armed"); People v. Dwyer, 155 N.E. 316, 317 (Ill. 1927) (holding that
when the character of the weapon used in a robbery is doubtful, it is a question for
the jury to consider the weapon, the manner in which it was used, and the
circumstances of the case).
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decision would have been simple: Dixon intended to convince the
tellers the lighter was a gun, and he likely did convince them.
Moreover, because a goal of the Federal Bank Robbery Act is to deter
persons from attempting bank robberies, increasing the punishment
for bank robbers who endeavor to use objects as weapons arguably
could deter individuals from even attempting this specific act.'
CONCLUSION
The "armed bank robbery" provision of the Federal Bank Robbery
Act can logically encompass situations like the one in Dixon. Bank
robbery victims encountering a bank robber wielding an object
during a bank robbery can reasonably believe that object is actually a
weapon. This Comment argued that a hybrid approach would
effectively help courts analyze situations like the one that occurred in
Dixon. Specifically, under the hybrid approach, a bank robber
brandishing an object as a weapon would violate § 2113(d) when a
reasonable person in the victim's situation would have believed the
object was actually a weapon.
Someone who chooses to use an object-as opposed to a genuine
weapon-to rob a bank should not be absolved of harsher
punishment when the robbery victims reasonably believe the object is
a weapon. Under this reasonable belief, those involved would likely
react to the object as if it were a real weapon. These reactions would
likely include retaliatory deadly force, which is where § 2113(d) derives
its jeopardy requirement. Under the hybrid approach, if those
involved discover, in whatever way, the object is not a weapon, then
there is no longer a reasonable belief and § 2113(d) is not
applicable.' However, it seems counterintuitive not to impose a
higher punishment on a bank robber who attempts to rob, or even
successfully robs, a bank by convincing everyone involved that an object
186. It is important to keep in mind that if a court decided, under the hybrid
approach, that a victim did not have a reasonable belief the object was a weapon, he
could still be punished under § 2113(a). However, individuals who use inherently
harmless objects as weapons to rob a bank should, at least, have the potential to
receive § 2113(d)'s harsher punishment, pending whether a victim's belief that the
object was a weapon was reasonable.
187. For an interesting example of a clearly simulated weapon, see Patrick Edgell,
Irate Customer Raises 'Finger Guns' in Attempted Bank Robbery, KESQ (Aug. 4, 2015 1:29
PM) http://www.kesq.com/news/irate-customer-uses-finger-guns-in-attempted-bank-
robbery/34528620, covering an incident in which a woman attempted to rob a bank
by raising a finger, imitating a gun. Under the hybrid approach, any reasonable
belief that the woman was wielding an actual would be destroyed upon seeing the
simulated "gun."
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is actually a weapon. Accordingly, the hybrid approach proposes a
framework effectively balancing the need to punish defendants
appropriately, while also remaining fair to those defendants.
Dixon raised an interesting question: how is a kielbasa in a bank
robber's pocket different from a gun? Logic would certainly argue
there is a huge difference, and that no one has ever been shot with a
kielbasa. However, there may be a time when a sly bank robber
convinces everyone that the kielbasa he wields is actually a gun,
rendering the innocent nature of this otherwise harmless delectable
sinister.

